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# MOBILIZATION OF POPULATION FOR WINNING THE WAR

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The conversion of a great peaceful population into an efficient fighting force turns first upon the internal distribution of the factors of the industrial organization itself. Unless these factors are so divided and distributed that the coefficients of the war can be maintained, first physical and then moral collapse are inevitable. The coefficients necessary to war are a fighting force, an industrial system that can turn out munitions, clothing and transportation and steady food production. Russia had food and men but no industries adequate to munitions, uniforms, shoes, railroads and motors. The Russian army was never fully armed and transport was always deficient. England had men and munitions, equipment and transport but inadequate food, and its strength has been strained to breaking in keeping up its food supply. France had food, mechanic force, and man supply in equipoise, as had Germany. These two countries have been manifestly more equal to the early strain of war and more continuously efficient than either of the other two, Russia and England. Italy and Austria were short in mechanic efficiency. Taking the experience of this war, one can almost say that unless a country has 4,000,000 tons of pig iron a year for every 1,000,000 in the field it cannot make war. Germany and Austria with the aid of the works seized in Belgium and North France had a total iron production of about 24,000,000 tons including the two Central Empires, Turkey and Bulgaria; German plants had to meet the needs of a total force steadily under arms of about 5,000,000, with as much more in various reserves. If the United States had not advanced its pig iron product to 40,000,000 tons, France and England with only 12,500,000 production of pig iron would have collapsed. As it was, this increase in our product kept Italy supplied and would have done this for Russia if transport had been available. The United States will have to raise its pig iron product to 50,000,000

tons a year, if the war continues and it raises the force needed to win the war.

A similar comparison can be carried out as to the constituent parts of a population using such approximate census returns as to occupations as are available. Exact statements are not possible and in the following comparison public services and various other callings are excluded. Russia had 60 per cent of its population raising food, 15 per cent in mining and manufacturing, and 7 per cent in trade and transport. Such a country will break down in trade and transport and be unable to arm its men. England has 15 per cent raising food, 47 per cent in mining and manufacturing, and 11 per cent in transportation. Mobilization would find food short. France was better balanced, 42 per cent raising food, 36 per cent in mines and manufactures, and 9 per cent in trade and motive powers. Germany had a still better distribution, 32 per cent in food, 40 per cent in mines and factories, and 12 per cent in trade and transportation. The war has shown how efficient this distribution is. Had Germany gone on for twenty years more reducing those raising food and increasing its mineral and factory population, it would have failed for food. Austria-Hungary with 65 per cent raising food, 16 per cent in mines and factories, and 14 per cent in transport, has shared the weakness and met almost as many defeats as Russia.

Comparing the United States for a similar period in 1900, this country had 36 per cent raising food, 15 per cent in mines and manufactures, and 16 per cent in trade and transport. It had in miscellaneous occupation and the professions, twice the number that Germany had in proportion to those employed, and a larger amount of woman labor not utilized in peace. Such a country can mobilize more men without disturbing its industries, draw on a larger reserve of women to take the place of men, and maintain its food, mining, and manufacturing plant and remain mobile. Owing to its large use of machinery on the farm, its food product per person at work is from two to three times as large as in the other countries cited, and this is true of its mines and manufactures. It has the food product needed, and a supply strained by the necessity of providing other lands which have let their food product diminish. The wealthy privileged class in England monopolizing

land, have used for sport, pleasure, and show, large areas which could and are now beginning to produce food.

The American people, therefore, enter war with a food plant which can put women to work, employing machinery and personal service on a large scale. Its possession of a large ratio of engineers, physicians, and men in similar callings enables it to meet both military and home demands without strains. Our social structure is more elastic and its reserves larger. Our proportion of men who have learned to act for themselves is greater, and this furnishes more men capable of being officers. Our proportion of women ready for any test and having the same education as men is greater and this lets loose a larger share of man power from home pursuits.

This is true also of England, but England has very few doctors; is drawing heavily on men capable of being officers; and has a smaller proportion of women with college and high school training equal to the higher grade of clerical, administrative, and directing posts. As the conflict goes on through the blood-stained years of war before us, it will be seen that no preparedness produces quite so efficient a society for conflict as one that has kept open to its entire society all paths and all opportunities, unhindered by privilege. The supple and enduring force of France is due to a like democratic organization. Autocracy and privilege in the Central Empires can win the first battles. Democracy will win the last and final battle.

The mobilization of a population is not, therefore, as it is envisaged by the public and most military men, the extraction by volunteering or draft of a certain number of men needed for war, from the general mass of men. This will be as useless as the 11,000,000 men gathered up by Russia at vast cost of life, labor and treasure of whom not nearly one-half ever saw a fighting line or handled a gun. Production was dislocated, pestilence sown, and the entire population demoralized because the mining, manufacturing, and transport plant was not equal to the task of arming, moving and supplying this unorganized mass. Mobilization turns on the capacity and the soundness of the whole body politic. Even if the mechanic and transport plant exists, if a nation has been careless about communicable diseases, these will plague its camps and arouse perilous doubt as to its military direction and its national direction and administration. Germany and the United States have led in lessening tuberculosis; both profit by this. France has lost at least

400,000 fighting men by this neglect, one-tenth its possible fighting force. Every step towards prohibition aids efficient mobilization. The fight against social disease which began twenty years ago, under the disapproval of many, is today a national asset of the first importance in the national mobilization of our fighting forces. "Preparedness" and "Mobilization," are not rifles, guns, explosives and herded masses of men. They are the organization of the national life in peace on the highest level. The American people are too often reproached for not rushing into the war in August, 1914. If a single military authority had been in control of this country, England, France, Italy and Russia, in 1914, the high command would not have called out men in this country. It would have set our industrial plant making arms for the armies of the country with a military establishment and an army and navy in being, which is what took place.

This would have brought the next step in mobilization, the remodelling of industry to meet the more accurate and highly specialized needs of war. Our industrial plant was not fit for this task, and its managers were ignorant of the fact. Where peace needs work on hundredths of an inch, war calls for accuracy to thousandths of an inch.

When war orders came our plants were not equal to the task. The Westinghouse Company has drawn attention in a recent report to a loss of at least \$5,000,000 in making 1,800,000 rifles for Russia and England. In the fall of 1914, when this contract was made, the estimate looked to a profit of some \$30,000,000, more or less. Deliveries were to begin midway in 1915. They actually began in February and March of 1916. The loss, originally placed at \$10,000,000 and later at \$5,000,000 with an expected profit of \$30,000,000 or a total of \$35,000,000 not cleared, as anticipated, was a fair measure of the cost in every possible form (delay, interest, deferred deliveries, training labor, installing new machinery) of bringing this establishment up to the standard required by modern arms of precision. This took place in munition contracts all over this country. The same disproportion between what was asked of American manufacturers, what they could do and what they lost in profits and what the government lost in delays, has taken place since war was declared by us. Shipbuilding has required like mobilization. All this is notably true of the Liberty motor. The failure has led to the re-

tirement of as able and patriotic a man as has been called to war service. These failures, these delays, and these losses are part of the cost of mobilizing our industry for war conditions.

So with dyes. Germany had \$400,000,000 invested in coal tar dyes. Coal tar is the chief source of high explosives. These dye works could be switched at once from dyes to explosives. This industry had to be created here. In what a different position would we have been, if coal tar dyes had been adequately protected as were iron, and steel at an earlier period?

If the Federal Reserve Board had not mobilized our banking, we should have had a financial strain and panic. Our railroads were congested, not because they were ill-managed or incompetent, but because the army and navy, untrained in the task of mobilizing transport, deranged the movement of trains by a vast confusion of "priority orders" when the new business created by war was alone enough to overtax our railroad system. Our railroads are now running at a loss as part of our war costs.

These changes are all part of adjusting the population of workers to the more arduous accuracy and speed of war. The mobilization of men for the fighting line is only the culmination of this general improvement for peace efficiency. The male population within our draft ages, 21 to 31 years, is one half unfit for the strain and rush, the physical strength and resistance to exposure, needed by war. Those ignorant of war thought that any man that could work could fight. The years from 21 to 31 have a larger share of those who can work but cannot fight than the years from 18 to 21. These years, called in all European countries and admitted to our regular army, were excluded here. These years yield men stronger for war, in better health, and freer from disease than the years from 21 to 31 years of age. This exclusion of those 18 to 21 years from the draft deprived the Republic of at least 2,500,000 men more ready for war, whose call would have less dislocated families and industry. These years, 18 to 21, were left at home and every national interest lost by it.

There are about 2,500,000 not naturalized white males over 21 years of age. These were included in the total population on which the draft was distributed among the states. The foreign-born males over 21 are two-fifths of all males over age in the New England and Middle States, more than a quarter in the Central and

Far Western States, and a twentieth in the South. This was a grave injustice to the Northern States, and to the nation. The last lost greatly in the distribution of industry. Under this plan, a larger proportion of white males over 21 than negro males over 21 were drawn.

Turning aside from the systematic exemption developed in European countries by a century's experience, exemption was left to local boards. This follows our national confidence in local self-government, and accepts the recent English example. Exceptions exist, but here local boards showed a very high standard of conscientious public service. This cumbrous, uneven, and in part irregular selection was too often unjust to individuals. The nation has never watched over its manhood and womanhood. It yearly counts its bales and bushels and tons, but not its men. In Germany, the whole body of manhood is recorded, watched and kept up to date. Were this done here, labor would be better employed. Every new demand for particular tasks could be met promptly, aiding both capital and labor, increasing the average year's wage, and reducing costs of production to the public. Industrially this would pay. Had this yearly census of all males and females in the industrial ages, over 14 years of age been kept year by year, with trades, callings and vocations, labor would have been more continuously at work, our elections would be better guarded, sanitary regulations would be more efficient, and in war the maximum of speed and efficiency would be gained. Governor Whitman's New York census began this work, and the government used it. Had it existed in all the states a half a year would have been saved. Compulsory military service would give this census and would be justified by industrial efficiency alone. Thanks to General Wood, provision for training officers has now been in progress for nearly a decade, and the mobilization of material for officers has been far more successful than any other part of the steps which turn a nation at peace into a nation at war.